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When Margaret Thatcher met the Chinese: UK’s SMEs policies in the 1980s and the 
case of See Woo Holdings 
 
Gordon C. K. Cheung and Edmund Terence Gomez 
Abstract: 
Purpose:  
This paper attempts to examine the UK’s SMEs policies under Margaret Thatcher’s era 
in the 1980s, with a view to understand the success stories, historical development and the 
structures of Chinese family business through a case study of See Woo Holdings Ltd. 
 
Design/methodology/approach 
We have achieved the objective on the study of the SMEs policies under Margaret Thatcher 
through critical evaluation of the historical literatures, books, journals and newspapers. The 
study on overseas Chinese business and the case of See Woo Holdings Ltd. is mainly through 
our research of the Chinese overseas in the UK and Southeast Asia and the companies report 
from the Companies House in the UK. We have usedthe latest 2011 UK Census dataset and 
academic reports to locate the most current demographic changes and Chinese business 
characteristicsin the UK and Northeast of England. 
 
Findings 
First, the UK’s SMEs policies under Margaret Thatcher were quite receptive towards the 
ethnic business. Secondly, the case of See Woo Holdings Ltd. indicates that family business 
networks are still one of the characteristics of Chinese business activity. Finally, the broader 
SMEs policies play an important role in our case of the Chinese business. 
 
Originality/value 
We provide a tentative linkage between the UK’s SMEs policies under Margaret Thatcher 
and Chinese family business. In addition, the case study of See Woo Holdings Ltd. improves 
our current understanding of Chinese family business with a clearer picture about their 
structure, practice, characteristics and development.   
 
Keywords: Chinese overseas, enterprise culture, ethnicity, family business, SMEs, 
supermarket 
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Introduction 
 
The 2011 Census put the population of Britain at 63.2 million (with 53 million in England, 
3.1 million in Wales, 5.3 million in Scotland and 1.8 million in Northern Ireland) (Office for 
National Statistics 2012, p. 1). The Chinese population (under the Asian/Asian British 
category) had reached 433,150, with a majority of them (124,250) living in the London area.
1
 
The economically active (aged 16-64) Chinese in England and Wales, 323,000 in total, were 
the least unemployed (five percent) among all Asian/Asian British ethnic groups (Office for 
National Statistics 2014, p. 6).
2
 
 
Such demographic figures in white-dominated societies where the Chinese are a minority 
community are not uncommon. What is intriguing is that these demographic figures provide 
insights into how the Chinese, though a minority community, have adopted novel business 
strategies in order to compete, even develop major enterprises, in a highly industrialized 
economy.
3
 Some enterprises, including now familiar household names such as Wing Yip, See 
Woo (both run major supermarkets), and Loon Fung (one of the oldest restaurants in 
London’s Chinatown),have been active in the British economy for more than four decades, 
creating in the process a close relationship with the non-Chinese business community. The 
historical development of these prominent Chinese-owned  businesses merits assessment in 
order to understand the evolution of Chinese family enterprises and their involvement, as well 
as influence, in the broader socio-economic British environment. 
 
The emergence of companies such as Wing Yip and See Woo in the wholesaling and retailing 
sector is particularly interesting because, according to enclave theory, ethnic-based 
enterprises exist to serve their own ethnic community or they merely function as middlemen, 
providing services based on their ethnic skills (Jones-Evans, Thompson and Kwong, 2011, 
pp. 221-222). From an empirical perspective, a study of these family-owned enterprises sheds 
important light on the implications of major economic policies on minority communities in 
                                                 
1
 London includes inner and outer London. See Table KS201UK, 2011 Census: Ethnic group1, local 
authorities in the United Kingdom. [http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/publications/re-reference-
tables.html?edition=tcm%3A77-327143] (accessed 9 April 2015) 
2
 This group was categorized according to Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Chinese, and other Asians. 
3
There is an enormous body of literature on the Chinese diaspora. See, for example, Liu (ed.) 
2006,Thunø (ed.) 2007, Benton and Gomez 2008, and Gomez and Benton (eds) 2015. 
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business such as the Chinese including their attempts to expand their clientele beyond their 
own ethnic community.  
 
This study, therefore, adopts a contemporary historical perspective to examine the economic 
circumstances in Britain during a defining moment its history in the early 1980s, when 
Margaret Thatcher came to power and began introducing neoliberal-type policies which had 
major implications on small-and-medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Chinese family 
businesses in Britain have historically functioned as SMEs (Benton and Gomez 2008; 
Cheung and Gomez 2013). Thatcher’s economic policies favored the market as they entailed 
restructuring or privatizing  state-owned entities and curbing the influence of trade unions, for 
example those in the mining industry
4
.The so-called ‘enterprise culture’ of her economic 
policies facilitated the development of SMEs, particularly in the 1980s, including those 
owned by the Chinese (Tong 2014, p. 16). This study will focus on See Woo Holdings Ltd., a 
London-based Chinese family business that was incorporated in the 1970s and which has 
established itself in the retailing and supermarket sector, to assess the significance of 
Thatcher’s economic policies on such enterprises. Insights into the growth of See Woo 
Holdings were obtained from an in-depth analysis of its company records that were filed with 
Companies House
5
.  
 
This article is divided into two sections: a review of Thatcher’s economic policies and a case 
study of See Woo Holdings. The assessment of Thatcher’s policies is further divided into 
three sub-sections including the reasons why she introduced these programs, their impact on 
SMEs, and the response to them from the European Union and Chinese businesses. Through 
an assessment of See Woo Holdings, we offer insights into three areas: the nature of this 
family business in its early years, the impact of Thatcher’s policies, and how the two shaped 
the development of this enterprise. 
                                                 
4
A large number of people were laid-off following the permanent closure of mining sites in the 
Northeast of Britain after Thatcher’s neoliberal policies were introduced which included a serious 
attempt to undermine the influence of trade unions, including those in the mining sector. When 
Thatcher died on 8 April 2013, hundreds of ex-miners in Durham organized a ‘funeral party’ to 
celebrate ‘the end of an era for the person who destroyed our coal mines’. See The Mirror 
[http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/margaret-thatcher-dead-durham-miners-1820941] (accessed 
10 April 2015) 
5
Companies House is a government database which houses the annual accounts of all companies 
operating in Britain. All companies are required by law to submit their annual accounts which are 
open to public scrutiny. Our dataset was obtained from the Companies House Archive at Leeds 
University. 
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Thatcher’s economic policies and enterprise development in the 1980s 
 
Thatcher’s reasons for her policies 
 
Between 1960 and 1980, the British government had largely neglected the concerns of SMEs. 
During these two decades, both Conservative and Labour government leaders had encouraged 
the development of large-scale enterprises in the belief that this would help enhance 
economies of scale in production; manufacturing output by big firms between 1958 and 1970 
supported this assumption. Marsden (1990, p. 239) noted that during this period ‘the 
concentration of industrial output increased, as the share of net output by the 100 largest 
firms (defined in terms of net output) increased from 22 percent of manufacturing net output 
in 1949 to about 40 percent in 1970. It remained at more or less that level through the 1970s, 
and early 1980s.’ Moreover, between the post-World War II period and the 1970s, although 
British capitalism had been characterized by increasing concentration of capital, there had 
been a significant growth in output and productivity.
6
  Government leaders also believed that 
large enterprises were better equipped to invest heavily in research and development (R&D) 
to develop new technology. Technological development would help increase plant size and 
improve efficiency, thus reducing production costs and enhancing profits. With much state 
support, the volume of large firms in Britain nearly doubled between 1958 and 1970 
(Marsden 1990, p. 239).  
 
During the economic recession of the early 1970s, however, the belief in the promotion of 
large firms as an important avenue to create employment, promote R&D, enhance 
productivity, and encourage innovation, came into question. In the mid-1980s, a number of 
major studies criticized the view that it was necessary for the state to encourage the growth of 
large firms, citing as examples the case of companies in Britain and the United States.  
 
Prais (1976), in his The Evolution of the Giant Firm in Britain, contended that economies of 
scale was not dependent on firm size, but on plant size. Prais argued that although the number 
                                                 
6
  See Scase and Geoffe (1980, p. 13), and Burrows (1991, p. 6) for an in-depth discussion on the 
growth of large-scale enterprises during the three decades after World War II and a critique of the 
view that the promotion of such enterprises benefited the British economy. 
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of companies controlled by a firm had grown significantly, the average plant size in these 
firms had decreased by half in some cases, leading to greater unemployment. In other words, 
industrial concentration was not a prerequisite for productive efficiency, nor would it 
necessarily generate employment. Piore and Sable (1984) posited an interesting argument in 
their volume, The Second Industrial Divide, about small-scale industries in continental 
Europe. These small firms had developed well because they were more flexible and better 
equipped for engendering and adopting innovations and they were capable of being more 
responsive to market needs. Later, Chandler (1990), in another important study, Scale and 
Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism, would argue that between the period 1880 and 
1940, in a number of capital intensive industries, British companies had failed to invest 
sufficiently in three key areas: manufacturing, marketing, and management. This trend of 
limited investments in these three key areas among large-scale enterprises appeared to have 
continued into the modern period.
7
 
 
Thatcher and the promotion of SMEs 
 
The manner of development of Chinese enterprises was deeply affected by government 
policies and economic change that had occurred during the 1980s. In 1979, when Thatcher 
took office as Prime Minister, she set about instituting major structural changes involving a 
reduction in the role of the state in the economy. Between 1945 and 1979, both Labour and 
Conservative-controlled governments had supported Keynesian-style state intervention and 
the nationalization of key economic sectors. Thatcher, on the other hand, introduced changes 
that involved, among other things, deregulation of markets and active privatization of 
government-owned enterprises. Thatcher also opened up the British economy to greater 
international competition and introduced policies to attract foreign investment. Thatcher’s 
promotion of ‘free market conservatism’ involved not just a check on the influence of trade 
unions but a desire to curb dependence on state welfare by encouraging initiative in industry. 
To encourage industry in business, Thatcher began actively supporting the development of 
                                                 
7
 For another important study making similar arguments of the efficacy of small-scale enterprises, see 
Best 1990. 
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SMEs,
8
 introducing a variety of institutional arrangements to facilitate their formation and 
growth.  
 
As questions were raised about the efficacy of large firms, the growing argument in the 1980s 
was for the need for greater decentralization of such companies (see, for example, Atkinson 
and Storey 1994). Thatcher was a strong advocate of the need to promote SMEs on the 
grounds that the economic future of the country lay with individual initiative and enterprise. 
This was embodied in her government’s promotion of what came to be popularly known as 
the ‘enterprise culture’, a somewhat nebulous concept, but one which basically referred to the 
need to consider entrepreneurship as a means for capital accumulation and social mobility 
(Burrows 1991). Another policy outcome from the promotion of this enterprise culture was 
the assumption that it would lead to the ‘generation of many new growing enterprises’ that 
would ‘create jobs and wealth’ as well as ‘inject dynamism and innovation into the economy’ 
(Dodd and Anderson 2001, p. 15). 
 
The government had begun to recognize the importance of the small firm in terms of creating 
employment as the economy began to move into a deep recession in 1979 that continued into 
the early 1980s. The British economy began to recover between 1986 and 1989, before the 
onset of another recession; the economy only began to move into another phase of recovery 
after the mid-1990s. During the period between 1948 and 1973, the average rate of 
unemployment ranged between 1.2 and 3.8 percent.  Between 1974 and 1979, unemployment 
had increased to between 2.6 and 5.7 percent, and during the period 1980 to 1989, it 
increased even further, ranging between 7.1 and 13.1 percent (Jeremy 1998, p. 57).  Atkinson 
and Storey (1994, pp. 12-13) also pointed out that during the 1980s, self-employment had 
grown significantly in many of the developed economies; quoting a 1992 OECD study, they 
showed that Britain had the fastest growth rate of self-employment among European 
countries between 1979 and 1990, rising from 7.5 percent in 1979 to 12.2 percent in 1990. 
According to the 1990 Labour Force Survey report, self-employment rose from below two 
million to almost 3.5 million between 1979 and 1989. Self-employment was concentrated in 
                                                 
8
 The definition provided by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) for small and large firms in 
terms of number of employees is: micro firm - 0 to 9 employees; small firm - 10 to 99 employees; 
medium firm - 100 to 499 employees; and large firm - 500+ employees (Jeremy 1998, p. 329). The 
same definition is adopted here for SMEs. 
7 
 
four sectors: construction, distribution, hotels, and financial services; with the exception of 
the hotel industry, all three other sectors showed an increase in self-employment between 
1981 and 1991.   
 
During the 1980s, there was a significant increase in the rate of new firm formation, 
especially of small companies, primarily in response to the escalating unemployment 
problem. After 1979, the government had also begun to introduce a number of schemes to 
support SME formation, including the Loan Guarantee Scheme, the Business Expansion 
Scheme, and the Enterprise Allowance Scheme. Several studies would later indicate that 
many SMEs would not have been able to sustain themselves without such forms of state 
support (Curran and Blackburn 1991). Between 1979 and 1989, the number of businesses 
rose by two-thirds, the vast majority of them operating as SMEs. By the end of 1989, there 
were approximately three million small firms in the UK, of which at least an estimated 95 
percent employed less than 20 people. 
 
Response from European Union and Chinese businesses 
A number of other reasons contributed to the rise in the volume of SMEs during the 1980s: 
the growing shift in industry from manufacturing to services, technological advances, 
fragmentation of larger firms, government policy to promote the enterprise culture, and the 
increasing availability of start-up capital (Atkinson and Storey 1994, pp. 12-13). Government 
policies were enforced to find avenues to channel support to small industries.  For example, 
statutory powers were vested with local authorities to enable them to support local firms. 
Such support included business counseling, grants for rent, improvement of premises, and 
market research, loan guarantees, and loans at subsidized rates of interest (Waldingeret al., 
1990, p. 184). 
 
Other factors encouraged the promotion of SMEs during the 1980s. After the European 
Parliament made 1982 the ‘Year of Crafts & Small & Medium Enterprises’, this drew further 
attention to the potential dynamism of SMEs, provided they had sufficient support from the 
state and financial institutions. From 1981, as civil unrest began to spread rapidly, 
government investigations into the factors that precipitated these incidents revealed that one 
reason was that the state had not focused enough attention on the interests of businesses 
owned by minorities, an issue the government began to address after 1986 (Waldingeret al., 
1990, p. 40). 
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In this climate of civil unrest affecting ethnic minorities and during a recession, the Thatcher 
government began promoting self-employment by supporting SMEs.
9
 During this period, a 
new generation of British-born Chinese was emerging. Better educated, a large number of 
them had secured professional qualifications (Jones 1993, pp. 102-03). A significant portion 
of these new middle-class British-born Chinese probably had a different conception of their 
identity, often one which involved no thought of returning to their parents’ homeland. For 
these reasons, a number of Chinese began considering a move into business. Since they were 
native English speakers, their command of Mandarin or other Chinese dialects was perhaps 
was not strong enough to facilitate business deals with relatives in China or Hong Kong. 
 
In his analysis of growing self-employment among ethnic minorities in Europe, Boissevain 
(1994) made a similar contention: since many of these migrants had begun establishing roots 
in the host country, this suggested that they no longer considered their stay as a temporary 
sojourn. Boissevain (1994) further argued that a number of other factors encouraged self-
employment among ethnic minorities in Europe. First, the unemployment rate among 
migrants was particularly high, compelling a number of them to go into business. Second, 
growing discrimination at work had encouraged ethnic minorities to consider alternative 
forms of employment. In England, writing in the early 1980s, Jones (1981) quoted a Chinese 
community officer’s estimate that up to 90 percent of Merseyside’s Chinese population was 
either self-employed or employed in Chinese-owned companies. 
 
The narrowing difference in educational qualifications between the Chinese and other British 
also influenced forms of self-employment within the community. For example, a number of 
Chinese who had become professionals but were interested in moving into business had 
ventured into services, particularly consultancies or into more high technology-based 
industries, especially in the computer-based sector. This process was aided by the significant 
growth in the high-technology sector as a whole from the early 1980s, because of much state 
support (Oakey 1991).  
 
                                                 
9After the Brixton riots in 1981 that involved attacks on minorities, the government started pump-
priming investment in order to support ethnic businesses, which were predominantly SMEs (Ram and 
Jones 2008, p. 358). 
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Another factor that aided the rise in the number of firms run by ethnic minorities was the 
relative ease with which such companies could secure loans from British banks. There are 
several reasons why small ethnically-run firms found it easier to gain access to funds from 
financial institutions in the UK. According to a publication by the Barclays Bank, Cultural 
Change and the Small Firm, the bank’s survey of 400 small firms registering turnovers of 
less than £1 million revealed that ethnic minority businesses played an important role in the 
small business sector. According to the Barclays Bank’s study, ethnic minorities, who then 
formed five percent of the British population, were responsible for around nine percent of 
new business start-ups, representing around seven percent of the total number of small 
business firms in the UK (quoted in Gidoomal 1997, p. 210). The Barclays Bank study also 
noted that companies owned by ethnic minorities from Asia continued to dominate the retail 
industry. 
 
During the late 1980s and into the early 1990s, there was a notable growth in the ethnic food 
industry. For example, between 1991 and 1996, the takeaway market was estimated to have 
grown by 23 percent, raking in an estimated turnover of £7 million annually; this included the 
traditional takeaways - pizza, fish & chips, Chinese, and Indian meals - which remained the 
industry’s backbone. During this period, described as a ‘renaissance of the UK restaurant 
sector’, there was also a significant increase in the number of people eating out in restaurants 
(Financial Times, 11 December 1996). Apart from this, according to Sharwood’s, a market 
leader in ethnic foodstuffs, the growth rate in sales for such products in the British market as 
a whole had been in double-digit percentage figures since the mid-1980s. The market in 
ethnic foods for home cooking - including Indian and Chinese products - was worth an 
estimated £129 million in the UK (Financial Times, 29 May 1996). 
 
Government policies, as well as immigration legislation, appear to have had a significant 
impact of the manner of development of enterprises owned by the Chinese. A notable change 
was noted in the types of business enterprises that the Chinese were involved in during the 
twentieth century; while they had had a prominent presence as laundrymen, they were now 
more ubiquitous as restaurateurs and retailers. This change appears to have been influenced 
by migration patterns, public policies, and generational change. There is sufficient evidence 
to argue that intra-ethnic business networks have not played a crucial role in determining the 
pattern of growth Chinese-owned firms (see Benton and Gomez 2008). A review, through a 
case study of See Woo Holdings, primarily during the period of Thatcher’s administration 
10 
 
(1979 to 1990), will help determine the factors that have influenced the manner of 
development of firms owned by members of this ethnic community. 
 
The case of See Woo Holdings and the Tse Family 
 
The initial years and the nature of family business 
See Woo Holdings Ltd. is the holding company of a group of firms that manufacture, 
wholesale, and retail food products. The Group’s wholesaling and retailing outlets as well as 
its manufacturing base are located in the London area, particularly near Wembley. Although 
See Woo Holdings is a private limited company under the control of the Tse family, this 
investment holding enterprise had a long list of shareholders. Incorporated on 7 October 
1988, See Woo Holdings had two subsidiaries, Way-On Foods Ltd., in which it had a 53.3 
percent stake, and S.W. Trading Ltd., which is wholly-owned. Way-On Foods is involved in 
food production and distribution, while S.W. Trading is a wholesaler and retailer of food 
products. Both these subsidiaries were established before See Woo Holdings: S.W. Trading 
on 24 January 1977 and Way-On Foods on 26 June 1986.  
 
See Woo Holdings was established to hold and coordinate the activities of the companies 
established by the Tse family. The main enterprise established by the Tse family was S.W. 
Trading, its wholesaling and retailing concern. The incorporation of Way-On Foods reveals 
that the See Woo Holdings Group developed its operations vertically, by venturing into food 
production for distribution, which helped improve profitability by reducing the dependence of 
the Group on foreign suppliers for its products. Apart from the distribution of its products in 
the UK, the Group had also, since the mid-1990s, managed to gain entry into markets in other 
countries in Europe, though its presence in these markets remained very small. 
 
The chairman of See Woo Holdings is Tsun Tse. Born in 1929, he arrived in Britain from 
Hong Kong and went into the food catering business. Tse first started a Chinese takeaway, 
then established a restaurant. He later opened a mini-market in Soho in London, the nucleus 
of the See Woo Supermarket which would emerge as one of the mainstay businesses of the 
Group. Two of Tsun Tse’s brothers later followed him to Britain. The elder of these two 
brothers, Stanley Tse, also established a Chinese restaurant, whilst the younger Tony H.W. 
Tse pursued his studies. Company records indicated that Tsun Tse and Stanley Tse were 
directors of Jasmine Garden Restaurant Ltd. when they set up the See Woo Supermarket (see 
11 
 
Figure 1). Tsun Tse was also a director of another restaurant company, Lantern House 
(Bushey) Ltd., whose other directors included Stanley Tse and Tony Tse.  From this initial 
involvement in business as restaurateurs, the Tse brothers would diversify into retailing by 
establishing See Woo Supermarket Ltd. 
Figure 1. See Woo Holdings Group Corporate Structure 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
                  Tse / Chan Families                                                  Tse family et.al 
 
 
 
 
              See Woo Holdings Ltd.                  Unico Trading       Unico Food                    Everco Ltd.* 
                                                                          Ltd.+                      Manufacturing Ltd.@* 
 
 
100%                        53.3% 
 
S.W. Trading Ltd.         Way-On Foods Ltd.      Unitnow Ltd.       Stanley Trading        Lantern House 
                                                                                                        (London) Ltd.           (Bushey) Ltd. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
*  Dissolved 
+  Dormant 
@ Divested 
 
 
 
See Woo Supermarket, though incorporated in January 1977 with a paid-up capital of 
£30,000, only commenced operations in Soho in 1978. By 1982, See Woo Supermarket’s 
operations had grown rapidly necessitating two significant changes. In view of the rapidly 
burgeoning Chinese food catering industry, the Tse family divested their interests in the 
restaurant trade to concentrate on wholesale and retail distribution of Chinese foods products. 
In 1982, to better reflect its move into wholesale distribution, the name of the company was 
changed from See Woo Supermarket to S.W. Trading. The range of goods the company dealt 
in eventually included Japanese, Vietnamese, and Korean products, totaling nearly 3,500 
items, probably the largest range of products distributed by a single Chinese-owned food 
distribution firm. As the retailing business grew, a warehouse was acquired in Wembley, 
which functioned as the base for S.W. Trading’s wholesaling operations. In 1993, S.W. 
Trading established a cash & carry outlet in Greenwich, a much larger supermarket than its 
outlet in Soho, thus expanding its retailing market. 
  
The original shareholders of S.W. Trading included, apart from Tsun Tse and Stanley Tse, 
H.W. Chan and N.K.H. Chan, as well as Kee Kwong Cheung, T.S. Tang, and Yuen Fook 
12 
 
Chung; other members of the Tse family among this list of original shareholders were Tony 
H.W. Tse, C.K. Tse, and P.Y. Tse. The original directors of S.W. Trading were Tsun Tse and 
Stanley Tse. The non-Tse family members who were shareholders of the company, 
particularly the Chans, are relatives, mainly cousins of the Tse brothers, who cooperated with 
them when they decided to venture into wholesaling through S.W. Trading. Tse’s relatives 
provided them with the additional funding required to operationalize the venture, thus 
emerging as shareholders of S.W. Trading. The Chan family remained shareholders of the 
company and still play a role in the running of the company, though most of them are not 
involved in major policy decision-making.   
 
All the shareholders of S.W. Trading were British Chinese. The largest shareholder of S.W. 
Trading when it was incorporated was Tsun Tse, who owned 6,000 shares of the company’s 
paid-up capital of £30,000, while Stanley Tse, Tony H.W. Tse,  C.K. Tse, P.Y. Tse, and H.W. 
Chan each held 3,000 shares; they would all also become members of the board of directors. 
Kee Kwong Cheung and T.S. Tang each held 3,000 shares, while N.K.H. Chan and Yuen 
Fook Chung each had an investment of £1,500 in the company. 
 
Throughout its history, although most of S.W. Trading’s shareholders were members of the 
Tse family, the list of shareholders included people outside the family. A comparison of the 
list of shareholders of See Woo Holdings in 1996 (Table 1) with the original shareholders of 
S.W. Trading indicates that in the Tse family, one new member, Rita Tse, was included as a 
shareholder. W.M. Chow, who acquired a stake in S.W. Trading in 1981, would retain a large 
stake in the company, and later See Woo Holdings. There were a number of new shareholders 
in the 1996 list: P.Y. Low, T.S. Tang, and H.L. Yu. Another new shareholder of See Woo 
Holdings was Y.M. Cheung, a Hong Kong national who became a British citizen. Most of 
these new shareholders who were not family relatives, like Y.M. Cheung, were family friends 
from Hong Kong who were incorporated as shareholders, but would not play a significant 
role in the management and development of the company. 
 
 
Table 1. See Woo Holdings Ltd.: List of Shareholders in 1996 
Name  Shareholding 
Tsun Tse (Chairman)                        7,500  
Stanley Tse (also a director)                        3,000  
Tony Hon Wing Tse (also a director)                        4,500  
Chun Keung Tse (also a director)                        4,500  
13 
 
Pak Yue Tse                        3,000  
Rita Tse                        1,500  
Hing Wah Chan (also a director)                        3,000  
Koon Sang Chan (also a director)                        3,000  
Alan Sui Lun Chan                        1,500  
Wai Ming Chow                        3,000  
Yeung Man Cheung                        1,000  
Yuen Fook Chung                        1,500  
Lucy Pui Ying Low                         1,500  
Tak Sing Tang (also a director)                        3,000  
Hung Lit Yu                        1,500  
Unico Trading Ltd.                        1,000  
Source: Company House Archive, Leeds University, United 
Kingdom 
 
In December 1989, the shareholders of S.W. Trading exchanged all their equity in the 
company for stock in See Woo Holdings, when the latter was established to act as a holding 
company for the Group. The directors of S.W. Trading in 1996 were K.S. Chan, H.W. Chan, 
Stanley Tse, Tsun Tse, Tony H.W. Tse, T.S. Tang, and Y.M. Cheung. Another company 
acquired by See Woo Holdings when it was incorporated was Way-On Foods, in which it 
would have a controlling stake. 
 
The spin-offs and subsidiaries  
Way-On Foods is involved in the manufacture of food products, including freshly-made 
chilled and frozen Chinese food which have a short shelf-life; most of these products are still 
made by hand. Catering primarily to a certain niche market when it began business, Way-On 
Foods had a select clientele of retailers who absorbed most of its products, though the 
company then hoped to expand its number of customers by expanding the range of its 
products. Incorporated in 1986 with a paid-up capital of £2, Way-On Foods’ original 
shareholders were Wendy Yung Tse and Rita Yang Tse, each of whom held one share of the 
company’s paid-up capital. The directors of the company in 1988 were Tsun Tse, Tony H.W. 
Tse, Stanley Tse, and Man Wah Liu. In 1989, when See Woo Holdings emerged as a major 
shareholder of Way-On Foods, the latter’s paid-up capital was increased to £75,000, of which 
40,000 shares, or 53.33 percent of its equity, was taken over by the new holding company; 
the other shareholders then of Way-On Foods, each holding 5,000 shares, were Tsun Tse, 
Wendy Tse, Rita Tse, Joan Mew Gee Tsang, King Wah Tang, Yak Wan Liu, and Hun Wa 
Liu.  The directors of Way-On Foods in 1990 were Tsun Tse, Tony H.W. Tse, Stanley Tse, 
M.W. Liu, and King Way Tang.   
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Way-On Foods was established to develop the See Woo Holdings Group’s interest in food 
manufacturing. As the list of shareholders and directors of Way-On Foods suggests, although 
the Tse family had primary control over the company, there was some co-ethnic business co-
operation, primarily with the Liu family. The Liu family had previously been involved in the 
restaurant business with the Tse family, and had been brought in to handle food production. 
Other shareholders of Way-On Foods were those who had also worked in the manufacturing 
of the Group’s food products and were part of the holding company’s management. None of 
the shareholders of Way-On Foods who were not part of the Tse family are shareholders of 
See Woo Holdings. By 1996, the directors of Way-On Foods were Stanley Tse, Tsun Tse, 
Tony H.W. Tse, and H.W. Liu, indicating the joint management of the Tse and Liu families 
of this manufacturing concern. Way-On Foods’ production factory is based in Wembley, next 
to S.W. Trading’s warehouse, to facilitate the distribution of its products. 
 
See Woo Holdings, incorporated just two years after Way-On Foods was established, was 
obviously to function as the holding company of the latter as well as S.W. Trading. Although 
the entire equity of S.W. Trading was injected into the holding company, only 53.33 percent 
of Way-On Foods’ equity was acquired by See Woo Holdings. The remaining equity of Way-
On Foods was owned primarily by the Liu family. In this regard, it is noteworthy that 
members of the Tse family were also directors of other companies which have not been 
incorporated into the See Woo Holdings Group. For example, Tsun Tse, See Woo Holdings’ 
chairman, is a director of Everco Trading Ltd. and Unitnow Ltd., while Tony H.W. Tse is 
also a director of Everco Trading, Unico Trading Ltd., and Unitnow. P.K. Tse is a director of 
Stanley Trading (London) Ltd. and Unico Trading, while Stanley Tse is a director of Everco 
Trading, Lantern House (Bushey), Stanley Trading (London), Unico Trading, and Unitnow. 
Most of these companies, established before the incorporation of See Woo Holdings, were 
firms used to enter into a particular venture with other Chinese who were not family 
members. For example, Unico Trading was involved in the retail and wholesale distribution 
of food and electrical products, while Unico Food Manufacturing was another enterprise 
involved in the manufacture, retail, and wholesale of food products. Such enterprises were an 
indication of the diverse range of business activities that the Tse family was involved in, 
though in a personal capacity, and not through its main holding company, See Woo Holdings. 
This indicated the Tse family’s desire to enter into any business venture, when a proposal was 
submitted by another Chinese, if the idea sounded potentially profitable.  
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There have, inevitably, been transactions between companies in the See Woo Holdings Group 
and a number of these firms in which members of the Tse family had an interest in. For 
example, in 1981, S.W. Trading made purchases amounting to £38,211 from Stanley 
Trading; at that time, all the directors of S.W. Trading, with the exception of T.S. Tang, were 
directors of Stanley Trading. In 1983, S.W. Trading had business transactions with Unico 
Trading and Unico Food Manufacturing. 
 
Company records indicate, however, that a number of these companies in which the Tse 
family had had an interest in have been dissolved or are now dormant. For example, Unico 
Trading, incorporated in 1981, ceased trading in 1987 and has since remained a dormant 
company. Unico Trading, however, still retains some ownership of equity in See Woo 
Holdings. The directors of Unico Trading included members of the Tse family and H.W. 
Chan, K.S. Chan, and Y.M. Cheung who are also shareholders of See Woo Holdings. 
Between 1982 and 1985, Unico Trading, which had a paid-up capital of £20,000 had been 
registering turnovers ranging between £127,839 and £96,068, but had not been able to record 
significant profits. In 1987, when Unico Trading’s operations ceased, its turnover had fallen 
to £56,339 and its losses had been trimmed down to £825. Another company owned by the 
Tse family, Everco Ltd., was dissolved in 1993; incorporated in 1987, it was engaged in the 
import and wholesale of vegetables. In this venture, the Tse family collaborated with a 
different group of Chinese. The original directors of Everco included, apart from Tsun Tse, 
Stanley Tse, H.W. Tse and C.K. Tse, Fung Fung, K.C. Lam, and Fai Leung. Unico Food 
Manufacturing was incorporated in 1981, and the original directors and shareholders of the 
company were members of the Tse family and W.M. Cheung. The Tse family would, 
however, divest their interest in the company within a few years. Unico Food Manufacturing 
was dissolved in 1996.  
 
Business and development  
Following its incorporation in the late 1970s, S.W. Trading’s accounts indicate that the 
company had secured loans from banks which have significant operations in Hong Kong and 
China. For example, the company secured loans from the Bank of China, the Overseas Trust 
Bank, and the Hong Kong & Shanghai Bank, though the bank which provided S.W. Trading 
with the largest volume of loans was the British-based Barclays Bank. According to See Woo 
Holdings’ financial consultant, Ken Parmer, while the British banks were important to handle 
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loans and their business in the UK, the Asian-based banks were useful for providing letters of 
credit (LCs) for the company’s international trade, i.e., involving the acquisition of supplies 
from abroad for their UK-based wholesaling and retailing business. Common ethnic identity 
had not been, according to Parmer, a factor in determining which bank the Group decided to 
approach for LCs and loans; rather, the decision was based solely on which banks provided 
the most favorable interest rates for loans and LCs and the best financial services.  
 
The capital required to enter into the wholesaling and retailing industry had come from 
immediate family members of the Tse brothers, as well as from personal savings and profits 
from their restaurant business. There is no indication that the companies in the See Woo 
Holdings Group have secured funding from abroad, though there is evidence that the 
company had links with people in Hong Kong. For example, one shareholder of See Woo 
Holdings was residing in Hong Kong. The See Woo Holdings Group, however, is the only 
company among the largest Chinese-owned enterprises which provides any evidence of intra-
ethnic business cooperation which had been sustained for a protracted period;
10
 this can be 
seen particularly in the case of its subsidiary, Way-On Foods, a venture jointly owned the 
Tses and non-family members. 
 
Table 2 provides a detailed breakdown of the performance of the companies in the See Woo 
Holdings Group. S.W. Trading, the main company in the Group, had consistently registered 
significant growth in the volume of its turnover. In 1978, the year of its incorporation, S.W. 
Trading recorded a turnover of £588,827; by 1981, its turnover had increased almost four-
fold, to £2.01 million, before doubling to £5.77 million in 1985. During the next decade, 
S.W. Trading’s turnover volume would continue to rise significantly, and by 1997, when it 
recorded its highest turnover, of £28.8 million, this was almost five times the turnover 
volume it recorded in 1985, suggesting that it had also benefited from policies that had been 
introduced during Thatcher’s administration. S.W. Trading’s accounts indicate that the 
company incurred a pre-tax loss only once; in 1982, a loss of £49,634 was recorded. There 
have, however, been significant fluctuations in the pre-tax profits it has recorded. For 
example, in 1983, one year after S.W. Trading recorded its first pre-tax loss, the company’s 
pre-tax profit rose to £173,863, which fell to £61,034 in 1984 before appreciating 
significantly to £236,424 in 1987 before falling again to around £62,000 in 1989. In 1993, 
                                                 
10
For an in-depth review of intra-ethnic business ties involving Chinese-owned SMEs, see Gomez and 
Benton (2008: 63-149). 
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S.W. Trading recorded its highest pre-tax profit, of £495,000, which fell the following year to 
£285,000, a commendable figure nonetheless. The opening of its cash & carry outlet in 
Greenwich in 1993 contributed appreciably to its increased turnover. There has also been a 
significant increase in the number of employees on S.W. Trading’s payroll; between 1983 
and 1997, the number of its employees increased almost five-fold, from 30 to 148. 
 
In the early 1990s, the Tse family felt that S.W. Trading’s potential for growth was still 
viable in spite of the growing competition in the ethnic food distribution market. One reason 
for this is that S.W. Trading functioned primarily as wholesalers rather than retailers. Since 
the 1970s, the Group had also established a clientele base that it could depend on. During the 
initial stages of the Group’s growth, the Tse family concentrated their resources and labor on 
developing their London-based outlet. Rather than opening new outlets in other cities which 
would have entailed a significant amount of capital investment which they felt could have 
been more productively deployed in developing their business in London, the Tses 
established links with ethnic Chinese in other parts of the country; most of these Chinese 
were known to the Tses. The Tses encouraged their Chinese counterparts to go into retailing 
of food products, provided some of them with the initial capital they required to start the 
business and gave them favorable terms of credit to keep the business functioning. A number 
of these Chinese enterprises still operate, independent of the Tses, but for whom S.W. 
Trading remain the major source of their supplies. This long-established client base ensured 
that the S.W. Trading would continue to register a minimum turnover to enable it to operate 
profitably. In fact, according to Parmer, S.W. Trading does not have sales representatives as 
the Group feels that their main business remains in wholesaling. The Group does, 
occasionally, supply some of their products to other major retailers of Chinese food, 
including Wing Yip, but such links are not formal.   
 
The See Woo Holdings Group’s management did not see the need to develop supply links 
with major retailing supermarkets, like Tesco or Sainsbury, even though the group had gone 
into food production, as they felt that the demands made by these huge retailers on the quality 
of their products were at times unrealistic. There was some justification to this argument 
made by See Woo Holdings’ management. Independent studies have shown that food 
manufacturers have found it quite competitive securing shelf-space for their products in 
major supermarkets (Maunder 1980, pp. 86-88). Moreover, marketing expenses to promote a 
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new product are extremely high and it is difficult for new entrants in the market to displace 
more established brands.  
 
Way-On Foods also registered a consistent rise in its volume of turnover, though its 
performance was not as significant as that of S.W. Trading. In 1988, Way-On Foods posted a 
turnover of £255,791, which continued to rise until 1993, when it peaked at £866,280 before 
dropping to £787,909 in 1994. Since then, however, its turnover continued to rise, and in 
1997, Way-On Foods recorded a turnover of £1.25 million. Although the company registered 
a pre-tax loss in the first three years of its operation, since 1993, Way-On Foods has 
consistently recorded pre-tax profits which peaked at £108,748 in 1995; in 1997, however, its 
pre-tax profit was half this amount, £54,604, although the company had recorded a 
substantial increase in turnover during this period. The number of employees in Way-On 
Foods had increased from 11 in 1988 to 20 in 1997. 
 
The consolidated accounts of See Woo Holdings indicates that since its incorporation in 
1989, when the company recorded a turnover of £11.22 million, the company’s sales volume 
consistently increased annually; in 1997, its turnover was £28.85 million. The company 
recorded a loss only once since incorporation, of £311,208 in 1990, but had since then 
persistently registered pre-tax profits, which peaked at £545,000 in 1993. The company 
accounts of the See Woo Holdings Group indicate that the activities of the subsidiaries of this 
Group had emerged as the mainstay of the business ventures undertaken by the Tse family, in 
spite of their diverse business interests (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2. See Woo Holdings Group Company Performance           
         
See Woo Holdings Ltd. (Consolidated Account) 
     
         
Year 1989 1990 1991 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Turnover 
        
11,223,845  
        
12,626,539  
        
14,389,334  
         
16,321,000  
        
19,241,000  
      
24,551,000  
     
27,024,000  
     
28,854,000  
Pre-tax profits 
               
61,750  
-            
311,208  
             
200,144  
            
545,000  
            
320,000  
           
165,000  
           
141,000  
          
357,000  
No. of 
employees 
                     
65  
                     
67  
                      
70  
                     
94   na  
                  
156  
                  
155  
                  
168  
Issued capital 
              
45,500  
              
45,500  
               
45,500  
              
44,000  
              
44,000  
             
44,000  
            
46,000  
            
46,000  
         
S.W. Trading Ltd. 
       
         
Year 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1985 1987 
Turnover 
            
588,827  
           
1,009,751  
          
1,348,292  
          
2,105,607  
         
2,403,934  
         
3,615,164  
       
5,767,620  
       
9,322,832  
Pre-tax profits 
               
12,867  
              
32,003  
              
113,726  
               
49,100  
-             
49,634  
           
173,863  
             
61,034  
          
236,424  
No. of 
employees  na   na   na   na   na  
                    
30  
                   
30  
                   
54  
Issued capital 
              
30,000  
              
30,000  
               
30,000  
              
36,000  
              
36,000  
             
36,000  
            
45,500  
            
45,500  
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(Con't) 
        
         
Year  1989 1991 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
 
Turnover 
        
11,223,845  
        
13,800,926  
        
15,879,000  
        
18,942,000  
       
24,405,000  
       
26,611,000  
      
28,813,000  
 
Pre-tax profits 
               
61,750  
             
200,810  
             
495,000  
            
285,000  
              
57,000  
             
71,000  
          
302,000  
 No. of 
employees 
                     
65  
                     
70  
                      
83  
                     
99   na  
                  
139  
                  
148  
 
Issued capital 
              
45,500  
              
46,000  
               
46,000  
              
46,000  
              
46,000  
             
46,000  
            
46,000  
 
         
Way-On Foods Ltd. 
       
         
Year  1988 1990 1991 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Turnover 
             
255,791  
             
464,134  
             
813,408  
            
866,280  
            
787,909  
           
923,892  
        
1,079,562  
        
1,252,076  
Pre-tax profits 
-           
106,259  
-             
35,654  
-                  
666  
               
44,713  
              
35,476  
           
108,748  
            
70,770  
            
54,604  
No. of 
employees 
                      
11  
                      
18  
                      
20  
                      
16  
                      
12  
                    
14  
                    
16  
                   
20  
Issued capital  
                       
2  
              
75,000  
               
75,000  
              
75,000  
              
75,000  
             
75,000  
            
75,000  
            
75,000  
Source: Company House Archive, Leeds University, United 
Kingdom 
     Note: currecy in UK pound, na = not available, - = 
lost 
      
  
 
Since the Tse family evidently felt that there was still a large market to be tapped for their 
products in the UK, they did not show a great desire to expand their markets abroad. Since 
the See Woo Holdings Group had also created an established clientele for its products, which 
the Tses felt could be sustained for a long time, the holding company did register a significant 
decline in turnover. However, in view of the competition in the distribution of ethnic food, 
the Tses recognized that they would probably not see a significant increase in turnover either. 
Thus, their emphasis on developing their manufacturing base, as a means to develop a 
vertically-based enterprise, through which profitability could be increased by reducing the 
volume of their imports. Way-On Foods, for example, began to turn a profit, even registering 
an increasing volume of turnover. The Tses probably believed that if they developed Way-On 
Foods’ range and volume of products, the prospects for growth of the See Woo Holdings 
Group  would increase. 
 
The See Woo Holdings Group’s company structure suggests that the Tse family began 
adopting a more focused approach to business, concentrating on food production, 
wholesaling, and retailing. While the Tse family had shown a proclivity to venture into any 
business that appeared potentially profitable, this form of business development appeared to 
be diminishing, as reflected in See Woo Holdings’ corporate structure. In one way, the Tse 
family’s business links with other ethnic Chinese is a paradox. The family’s long-established, 
but informal, food distribution network comprising primarily other Chinese had remained a 
major source of fixed revenue for the See Woo Holdings Group. On the other hand, none of 
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the businesses that the Tses had ventured into with other Chinese, through the incorporation 
of companies to distribute electrical products or for the sale of vegetables, have proved 
successful. Their only cooperation with other Chinese in business through a company which 
had proven successful was their involvement in manufacturing with the Liu family, through 
Way-On Foods. Similarly, although most of the imports made by S.W. Trading from abroad 
were from companies owned by Chinese in Asia, including in China, Hong Kong, and 
Malaysia, the Tse brothers spent a lot of time in the region seeking out new suppliers and 
products which could help enhance the profit potential of the Group.  
  
Conclusion 
Thatcher’s neoliberal economic policies have, with much merit, come under serious criticism, 
including for her treatment of trade unions.
11
 However, the early years of Thatcher’s era 
could well be seen as the best of time for SMEs with her emphasis on supporting these firms 
through her promotion of an ‘enterprise culture’ which was also a response to social 
problems. Since the economic situation in Britain in the 1970s had contributed to growing 
unemployment, Thatcher’s SME policies encouraged self-employment and entrepreneurship, 
which coincided with Chinese start-ups while also allowing existing businesses to further 
expand, including in retailing and wholesaling. The social problems the Chinese were 
confronted with, specifically discrimination and civil unrest during the late 1970s, were core 
factors that compelled them to enter into business. 
 
This historical profile of the See Woo Group, one of the most prominent Chinese family 
businesses, provides important insights into its mode of development during the period from 
the late 1970s until the early 1990s. The See Woo Group’s development indicates that 
Chinese businessmen in Britain had benefited from the government’s initiative to nurture 
SMEs through various incentives. The active promotion of SMEs was a major factor that had 
pushed minorities into business, though a majority remained very small enterprises (Benton 
and Gomez 2008, pp. 63-149). Although there is no indication that Chinese firms obtained 
state aid in the form of funds, as is also the case with the See Woo Group, the general 
environment within which these enterprises were developed was conducive for operating 
SMEs. See Woo Group harnessed opportunities such as the more accommodating banking 
                                                 
11
See, for example, Harvey 2005. 
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facilities for SMEs and the inclusive business climate that had been created by the 
government.  
 
A crucial factor that contributed to this Group’s rise was that it was under the control of one 
family, though there is evidence of much help from friends and co-ethnics to develop the 
enterprise.  There is no evidence, however, that these co-ethnic ties remained important as the 
See Woo Group emerged as a large enterprise, evolving into a company controlled by only 
one family. There is evidence the Tse family secured financial aid based on intra-ethnic 
considerations; this, however, was for mutual benefit. By providing funds to co-ethnics 
around the UK to develop Chinese food retailing outlets, the See Woo Group was able to 
create a wide distribution network. 
 
The case of the See Woo Group indicates that the early generation of migrants such as the 
Tse brothers had a penchant to diversify their businesses by venturing into a variety of 
economic sectors. The Group, however, thrived most through trading, in the wholesaling and 
retailing of ethnic food products. By the late 1980s, the Group began to adopt a focused 
approach to the development of the companies under its control. A clear attempt to develop a 
vertically-integrated enterprise had emerged, with the Group focusing on the production, 
wholesaling and retailing of food products.  The Group’s move into manufacturing enhanced 
its profitability as it helped reduce the cost of purchasing goods from suppliers. 
 
Individual endowments, specifically class resources, provide the best explanation for the 
development of the largest Chinese enterprises. As the case of the See Woo Group indicates, 
the owners of this enterprise had entrepreneurial qualities. The Tse brothers provided a 
combination of resources to their enterprise; while some had been privy to formal education, 
all three had been in food catering for some time before venturing into wholesaling and 
retailing. This Group was among the first entrants into the wholesaling and retailing of ethnic 
food in Britain.
12
  The See Woo Group was led by men who had moved into this sector in the 
early 1970s to serve the burgeoning food catering sector. This company had the advantage of 
                                                 
12
The history of the development of the other major Chinese-owned company in Britain, the Wing Yip 
Group, indicates that this enterprise followed a similar pattern of business development, i.e. by 
venturing early into the wholesaling and retailing of ethnic-type food. See Cheung and Gomez (2012) 
for a case study of the Wing Yip Group. 
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establishing a presence and developing a reputation in the marketing of ethnic food supplies, 
initially Chinese food, though the range of food products it produced and sold soon expanded. 
After developing its presence in the food-distribution market in Britain, the Group built on 
this experience to diversify its trading operations in the international market. The See Woo 
Group was able to exploit business opportunities that had emerged, further indicating its 
entrepreneurial dynamism. 
 
In terms of organizational structure, the See Woo Group adopted the holding company 
approach, a method employed by other major Chinese enterprises such as the Wing Yip 
Group. This allowed the owners of See Woo to decentralize management and move resources 
around for the benefit of the Group as a whole. In the early stage of the Group’s growth, the 
owners had managed to keep costs low by recruiting family members as employees. With 
growth came the development of management hierarchies, which helped them professionalize 
their operations. 
 
The business strategies employed by the company had been effective. Among wholesaling 
and retailing companies, the range of products the Group offered had increased in the face of 
growing competition and to suit changing market trends. By specializing in the products they 
dealt with and by buying these products in large quantities, economies of scale was achieved.  
Increasing turnovers enabled the owners to be more innovative, in terms of seeking out 
markets abroad and by adopting vertically-oriented growth, by moving into the 
manufacturing of food products and by opening more retailing outlets and supermarkets. 
Much attention had clearly been devoted to studying market trends to seek out new business 
opportunities; in other words, there has been investment in research. 
 
The owners, as they were migrants, had links with people in Hong Kong, China, and 
Malaysia. However, there is no evidence that they secured much of their funds from abroad 
to expand the business.  Company records reveal that their sources of funding have primarily 
been local British banks, though there is evidence that they secured loans from the Bank of 
China Ltd, a bank incorporated in China which has established branches in the UK in an 
attempt to create a niche for itself among the Chinese community. Another bank which has 
been a major source of funding, primarily for those enterprises owned by older generation 
Chinese, is the Hong Kong & Shanghai Bank which has a long history of involvement in 
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Asia. There is evidence that in the early stages of the See Woo Group’s growth, there was a 
dependence on co-ethnic friends for funding whilst some also served as shareholders. 
 
Some of the major features that characterize how large companies have evolved is evident 
here. The Tse family’s ability to identify or capture niche markets and the change from a 
diversified to a more focused approach to business, as well as their capacity to secure funding 
for business expansion have facilitated the development of the Group. Intra-ethnic 
cooperation had been crucial for them when they first entered into business, though the 
importance of such ties have clearly diminished with the growth of the Group.   
 
The See Woo Group has also shown the capacity to develop an innovative marketing strategy 
that enabled them to expand their client base in spite of the decline in the food catering 
industry during the 1970s. The Group has also reinvested funds in the enterprise in an attempt 
to develop its profit potential. For example, even though the Group’s venture into 
manufacturing had initially contributed to significant losses, the Tse family’s attempt to 
develop a vertically-integrated enterprise began to turn a profit. 
 
The access Chinese businessmen have had to funds is evidently a key factor that has 
facilitated growth of their enterprises; such funding, however, was not primarily from 
Chinese sources. Funds to venture into business have come from their own savings, with 
additional help from banks, primarily from British banks, an outcome of Thatcher’s 
promotion of SMEs. By establishing a reputation with their bankers, they have managed to 
build up the volume of loans made available to them. Some British banks appear to have 
benefited by reaching out to the market created by ethnic minorities who were emerging as a 
major force among small enterprises. For example, apart from the See Woo Group, a large 
number of the company files viewed during this research indicated that Chinese businessmen 
have secured loans from Barclays Bank. Although a majority of these Chinese businessmen 
have used the banking facilities provided by the branches of banks incorporated in East and 
Southeast Asia, such as the Bank of China and Bank of East Asia, none of these businessmen 
have secured much more favorable loans and interest rates from these banks. 
 
The history of the See Woo Group indicates the importance of public policies to aid the 
development of small entrepreneurial firms. It was this issue that Thatcher had recognized 
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and moved to support and small firms owned by entrepreneurial Chinese in Britain had 
responded in a manner that allowed them to benefit from these policies.  
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